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Abstract
It is common practice in deep learning to use over-
parameterized networks and train for as long as
possible; there are numerous studies that show,
both theoretically and empirically, that such prac-
tices surprisingly do not unduly harm the gener-
alization performance of the classifier. In this
paper, we empirically study this phenomenon
in the setting of adversarially trained deep net-
works, which are trained to minimize the loss
under worst-case adversarial perturbations. We
find that overfitting to the training set does in
fact harm robust performance to a very large de-
gree in adversarially robust training across mul-
tiple datasets (SVHN, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100,
and ImageNet) and perturbation models (`∞ and
`2). Based upon this observed effect, we show
that the performance gains of virtually all recent
algorithmic improvements upon adversarial train-
ing can be matched by simply using early stop-
ping. We also show that effects such as the dou-
ble descent curve do still occur in adversarially
trained models, yet fail to explain the observed
overfitting. Finally, we study several classical and
modern deep learning remedies for overfitting, in-
cluding regularization and data augmentation, and
find that no approach in isolation improves sig-
nificantly upon the gains achieved by early stop-
ping. All code for reproducing the experiments
as well as pretrained model weights and training
logs can be found at https://github.com/
locuslab/robust_overfitting.
1. Introduction
One of the surprising characteristics of deep learning is the
relative lack of overfitting seen in practice (Zhang et al.,
2016). Deep learning models can often be trained to zero
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Figure 1. The learning curves for a robustly trained model repli-
cating the experiment done by Madry et al. (2017) on CIFAR-10.
The curves demonstrate “robust overfitting”; shortly after the first
learning rate decay the model momentarily attains 43.2% robust
error, and is actually more robust than the model at the end of train-
ing, which only attains 51.4% robust test error against a 10-step
PGD adversary for `∞ radius of  = 8/255. The learning rate is
decayed at 100 and 150 epochs.
training error, effectively memorizing the training set, seem-
ingly without causing any detrimental effects on the gener-
alization performance. This phenomenon has been widely
studied both from the theoretical (Neyshabur et al., 2017)
and empirical perspectives (Belkin et al., 2019), and re-
mains such a hallmark of deep learning practice that it is
often taken for granted.
In this paper, we consider the empirical question of overfit-
ting in a similar, but slightly different domain: the setting of
adversarial training for robust networks. Adversarial train-
ing is a method for hardening classifiers against adversarial
attacks, i.e. small perturbations to the input which can drasti-
cally change a classifier’s predictions, that involves training
the network on adversarially perturbed inputs instead of
on clean data (Goodfellow et al., 2014). It is generally re-
garded as one of the strongest empirical defenses against
these attacks (Madry et al., 2017).
A key finding of our paper is that, unlike in traditional
deep learning, overfitting is a dominant phenomenon in
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adversarially robust training of deep networks. That is,
adversarially robust training has the property that, after a
certain point, further training will continue to substantially
decrease the robust training loss of the classifier, while
increasing the robust test loss. This is shown, for instance,
in Figure 1 for adversarial training on CIFAR-10, where the
robust test error dips immediately after the first learning rate
decay, and only increases beyond this point. We show that
this phenomenon, which we refer to as “robust overfitting”,
can be observed on multiple datasets beyond CIFAR-10,
such as SVHN, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet.
Motivated by this initial finding, we make several contribu-
tions in this paper to further study and diagnose this problem.
First, we emphasize that virtually all the recent gains in ad-
versarial performance from newer algorithms beyond simple
projected gradient descent (PGD) based adversarial training
(Mosbach et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2019;
Zhang et al., 2019c) can be attained by a much simpler ap-
proach: using early stopping. Specifically, by just using an
earlier checkpoint, the robust performance of adversarially
trained deep networks can be drastically improved, to the
point where the original PGD-based adversarial training
method can actually achieve the same robust performance
as state-of-the-art methods. For example, vanilla PGD-
based adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017) can achieve
43.2% robust test error against a PGD adversary with `∞ ra-
dius 8/255 on CIFAR-10 when training is stopped early, on
par with the 43.4% robust test error reported by TRADES
(Zhang et al., 2019c) against the same adversary. This phe-
nomenon is not unique to `∞ perturbations and is also seen
in `2 adversarial training. For instance, early stopping a
CIFAR-10 model trained against an `2 adversary with ra-
dius 128/255 can decrease the robust test error from 31.1%
to 28.4%.
Second, we study various empirical properties of overfit-
ting for adversarially robust training and how they relate
to standard training. Since the effects of such overfitting
appear closely tied to the learning rate schedule, we begin
by investigating how changes to the learning rate schedule
affect the prevalence of robust overfitting and its impacts on
model performance. We next explore how known connec-
tions between the hypothesis class size and generalization in
deep networks translate to the robust setting, and show that
the “double descent” generalization curves seen in standard
training (Belkin et al., 2019) also hold for robust training
(Nakkiran et al., 2019). However, although this is used as
a justification for the lack of overfitting in the standard set-
ting, surprisingly, changing the hypothesis class size does
not actually mitigate the robust overfitting that is observed
during training.
Our final contribution is to investigate several techniques
for preventing robust overfitting. We first explore the effects
of classic statistical approaches for combating overfitting
beyond early stopping, namely explicit `1 and `2 regular-
ization. We then study more modern approaches using data
augmentation, including cutout (DeVries & Taylor, 2017),
mixup (Zhang et al., 2017), and semisupervised learning
methods, which are known to empirically reduce overfitting
in deep networks. Ultimately, while these methods can miti-
gate robust overfitting to varying degrees, when trained to
convergence, we find that no other approach to combating
robust overfitting performs better than simple early stop-
ping. In fact, even combining regularization methods with
early stopping tends to not significantly improve on early
stopping alone. We find that the one exception is data aug-
mentation with semi-supervised learning, where although
the test performance can vary wildly even when training has
converged, at select epochs it is possible to find a model
with improved robust performance over simple early stop-
ping. Code for reproducing all the experiments in this pa-
per along with pretrained model weights and training logs
can be found at https://github.com/locuslab/
robust_overfitting.1
2. Background and related work
One of the first approaches to using adversarial training
was with a single step gradient-based method for generating
adversarial examples known as the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014). The adversary was
later extended to take multiple smaller steps, in a technique
known as the basic iterative method (Kurakin et al., 2016),
and eventually reincorporated into adversarial training with
random restarts, commonly referred to as projected gradient
descent (PGD) adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017).
Further improvements to both the PGD adversary and the
training procedure include incorporating momentum into the
adversary (Dong et al., 2018), leveraging matrix estimation
(Yang et al., 2019), logit pairing (Mosbach et al., 2018), and
feature denoising (Xie et al., 2019). Most notably, Zhang
et al. (2019c) proposed the method TRADES for adversarial
training that balances the trade-off between standard and
robust errors, and achieves state-of-the-art performance on
several benchmarks.
Because PGD training is significantly more time consuming
than standard training, several works have focused on im-
proving the efficiency of adversarial training by reducing the
computational complexity of calculating gradients and re-
ducing the number of attack iterations (Shafahi et al., 2019;
Zhang et al., 2019a; Wong et al., 2020). Separate works
have also expanded the general PGD adversarial training
1Since there are over 75 models trained in this paper, we se-
lected a subset of pretrained models to release (e.g. those which
are for Wide ResNets since those take the most time to train, and
can achieve the best performance in the paper)
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algorithm to different threat models including image trans-
formations (Engstrom et al., 2017; Xiao et al., 2018a), dif-
ferent distance metrics (Wong et al., 2019), and multiple
threat models (Maini et al., 2019; Trame`r & Boneh, 2019).
Other adversarial defenses that have been proposed were
not always successful, such as distillation (Papernot et al.,
2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) and detection of adver-
sarial examples (Metzen et al., 2017; Feinman et al., 2017;
Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Tao et al., 2018; Carlini, 2019),
which eventually were defeated by stronger attacks. Adver-
sarial examples were also believed to be ineffective in the
real world across different viewpoints (Lu et al., 2017) until
proven otherwise (Athalye et al., 2017), and a large number
of adversarial defenses were shown to be relying on obfus-
cated gradients and ultimately rendered ineffective (Athalye
et al., 2018), including thermometer encoding (Buckman
et al., 2018) and various preprocessing techniques (Guo
et al., 2017; Song et al., 2017).
Because many defenses were “broken” by stronger adver-
saries, a separate but related line of work has looked at
generating certificates which can guarantee or prove robust-
ness of the network output to norm-bounded adversarial
perturbations. While not always scalable to large convolu-
tional networks, methods for generating these robustness
certificates range from using Satisfiability Modulo Theories
(SMT) solvers (Ehlers, 2017; Huang et al., 2017; Katz et al.,
2017) and mixed-integer linear programs (Tjeng et al., 2019)
for exact certificates, to semi-definite programming (SDP)
solvers for relaxed but still accurate certificates (Raghu-
nathan et al., 2018a;b; Fazlyab et al., 2019). Other methods
focus on generating more tractable but relaxed certificates,
which provide looser guarantees but can be optimized during
training. These methods leverage techniques such as duality
and linear programming (Wong & Kolter, 2017; Dvijotham
et al.; Wong et al., 2018; Salman et al., 2019b; Zhang et al.,
2019b), randomized smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019; Lecuyer
et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019a), distributional robustness
(Sinha et al., 2017), abstract interpretations (Gehr et al.,
2018; Mirman et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2018), and interval
bound propagation (Gowal et al., 2018). Another approach
is to use theoretically justified training heuristics (Croce
et al., 2018; Xiao et al., 2018b) which result in models
which are verifiable by an independent certification method.
Highly relevant to this work are those that study the general
problem of overfitting in machine learning. Both regular-
ization (Friedman et al., 2001) and early stopping (Strand,
1974) have been well-studied in classical statistical settings
to reduce overfitting and improve generalization, and con-
nections between the two have been established in vari-
ous settings such as in kernel boosting algorithms (Wei
et al., 2017), least squares regression (Ali et al., 2018), and
strongly convex problems (Suggala et al., 2018). Although
`2 regularization (also known as weight decay) is commonly
used for training deep networks (Krogh & Hertz, 1992),
early stopping is less commonly used despite being studied
as an implicit regularizer for controlling model complex-
ity for neural networks at least 30 years ago (Morgan &
Bourlard, 1990).2 Indeed, it is now known that the standard
bias-variance trade-off from classical statistical learning the-
ory fails to explain why deep networks can generalize so
well (Zhang et al., 2016). Consequently, it is now standard
practice in many modern deep learning tasks to train for as
long as possible and use large overparameterized models,
since test set performance typically continues to improve
past the point of dataset interpolation in what is known as
“double descent” generalization (Belkin et al., 2019; Nakki-
ran et al., 2019). The generalization gap for robust deep
networks has also been studied from a learning theoretic
perspective in the context of data complexity (Schmidt et al.,
2018) and Rademacher complexity (Yin et al., 2018).
Also relevant to this work are methods specific to deep
learning that empirically reduce overfitting and improve
performance of deep networks. For example, Dropout is a
commonly used stochastic regularization technique that ran-
domly drops units and their connections from the network
during training (Srivastava et al., 2014) with the intent of pre-
venting complex co-adaptations on the training data. Data
augmentation is another technique frequently used when
training deep networks that has been empirically shown to
reduce overfitting. Cutout (DeVries & Taylor, 2017) is a
form of data augmentation that randomly masks out a sec-
tion of the input during training, which can be considered
as augmenting the dataset with occlusions. Another tech-
nique known as mixup (Zhang et al., 2017) trains on convex
combinations of pairs of data points and their corresponding
labels to encourage linear behavior in between data points.
Semi-supervised learning methods augment the dataset with
unlabeled data, and have been shown to improve generaliza-
tion when used in the adversarially robust setting (Carmon
et al., 2019; Zhai et al., 2019; Alayrac et al., 2019).
3. Adversarial training and robust overfitting
In order to learn networks that are robust to adversarial
examples, a commonly used method is adversarial training,
which solves the following robust optimization problem
min
θ
∑
i
max
δ∈∆
`(fθ(xi + δ), yi), (1)
2It is common practice in deep learning to save the best check-
point which can be seen as early stopping. However, in the standard
setting, the test loss tends to gradually improve over training, and
so the best checkpoint tends to just select the best performance at
the end of training, rather than stopping before training loss has
converged.
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Table 1. Robust performance showing the occurrence of robust
overfitting across datasets and perturbation threat models. The
“best” robust test error is the lowest test error observed during
training. The final robust test error is averaged over the last five
epochs. The difference between final and best robust test error
indicates the degradation in robust performance during training.
ROBUST TEST ERROR (%)
DATASET NORM RADIUS FINAL BEST DIFF
SVHN `∞ 8/255 45.6± 0.40 39.0 6.6
`2 128/255 26.4± 0.27 25.2 1.2
CIFAR-10 `∞ 8/255 51.4± 0.41 43.2 8.2
`2 128/255 31.1± 0.46 28.4 2.7
CIFAR-100 `∞ 8/255 78.6± 0.39 71.9 6.7
`2 128/255 62.5± 0.09 56.8 5.7
IMAGENET `∞ 4/255 85.5± 8.87 62.7 22.8
`2 76/255 94.8± 1.16 63.0 31.8
where fθ is a network with parameters θ, (xi, yi) is a train-
ing example, ` is the loss function, and ∆ is the perturbation
set. Typically the perturbation set ∆ is chosen to be an
`p-norm ball (e.g. `2 and `∞ perturbations, which we con-
sider in this paper), such that ∆ = {δ : ||δ||p ≤ } for
 > 0. Adversarial training approximately solves the inner
optimization problem, also known as the robust loss, using
some adversarial attack method, typically with projected
gradient descent (PGD), and then updates the model param-
eters θ using gradient descent (Madry et al., 2017). For
example, an `∞ PGD adversary would start at some random
initial perturbation δ(0) and iteratively adjust the perturba-
tion with the following `∞ gradient steps while projecting
back onto the `∞ ball with radius :
δ˜ = δ(t) + α · sign∇x`(f(x), y))
δ(t+1) = max(min(δ˜, ),−)
(2)
We denote error rates when attacked by a PGD adversary as
the “robust error”, and error rates on the clean, unperturbed
data as “standard error”.
3.1. Robust overfitting: a general phenomenon for
adversarially robust deep learning
In the standard, non-robust deep learning setting, it is com-
mon practice to train for as long as possible to minimize
the training loss, as modern convergence curves for deep
learning generally observe that the testing loss continues to
decrease with the training loss. On the contrary, for the set-
ting of adversarially robust training we make the following
discovery:
Unlike the standard setting of deep networks, overfitting for
adversarially robust training can result in worse test set
performance.
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Figure 2. Robust test error over training epochs for various learn-
ing rate schedules on CIFAR-10. None of the alternative smoother
learning rate schedules can achieve a peak performance compet-
itive with the standard piecewise decay learning rate, indicating
that the peak performance is obtained by having a single discrete
jump. Note that the multiple decay schedule is actually run for 500
epochs, but compressed into this plot for a clear comparison.
This phenomenon, which we refer to as “robust overfitting”,
results in convergence curves as shown earlier in Figure
1. Although training appears normal in the earlier stages,
after the learning rate decays, the robust test error briefly
decreases but begins to increase as training progresses. This
behavior indicates that the optimal performance is not ob-
tained at the end of training, unlike in standard training for
deep networks.
We find that robust overfitting occurs across a variety of
datasets, algorithmic approaches, and perturbation threat
models, indicating that it is a general property of the adver-
sarial training formulation and not specific to a particular
problem, as can be seen in Table 1 for `∞ and `2 pertur-
bations on SVHN, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet.
A more detailed and expanded version of this table sum-
marizing the full extent of robust overfitting as well as the
corresponding learning curves for each setting can be found
in Appendix A. We consistently find that there is a signif-
icant gap between the best robust test performance during
training and the final robust test performance at the end
of training, observing an increase of 8.2% robust error for
CIFAR-10 and 22.8% robust error for ImageNet against
an `∞ adversary, to highlight a few. Robust overfitting is
also not specific to PGD-based adversarial training, and
affects faster adversarial training methods such as FGSM
adversarial training3 (Wong et al., 2020) as well as top per-
forming algorithms for adversarially robust training such as
TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019c).
3Wong et al. (2020) also observe a different form of overfitting
specifically for FGSM adversarial training which they refer to
as “catastrophic overfitting”. This is separate behavior from the
robust overfitting described in this paper, and the specifics of this
distinction are discussed further in Appendix A.4.
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Figure 3. Learning curves showing standard and robust error rates
for a Wide ResNet model trained with TRADES on CIFAR-10.
Early stopping after the initial learning rate decay is crucial in
order to achieve the 43.4% robust test error reported by Zhang
et al. (2019c), which eventually degrades to 50.6% robust test error
when the training has converged.
Learning rate schedules and robust overfitting Since
the change in performance appears to be closely linked with
the first drop in the scheduled learning rate decay, we ex-
plore how different learning rate schedules affect robust
overfitting on CIFAR-10, as shown in Figure 2, with com-
plete descriptions of the various learning rate schedules in
Appendix B.1. In summary, we find that smoother learning
rate schedules (which take smaller decay steps or interpolate
the change in learning rate over epochs) simply result in
smoother curves that still exhibit robust overfitting. Further-
more, with each smoother learning rate schedule, the best
robust test performance during training is strictly worse than
the best robust test performance during training with the
discrete piecewise decay schedule. In fact, the parameters of
the discrete piecewise decay schedule can even be tuned to
slightly exacerbate the sudden improvement in performance
after the first learning rate decay step, which we discuss
further in Appendix B.2
3.2. Mitigating robust overfitting with early stopping
Proper early stopping, an old form of implicit regularization,
calculates a metric on a hold-out validation set to determine
when to stop training in order to prevent overfitting. Since
the test performance does not monotonically improve during
adversarially robust training due to robust overfitting, it is
advantageous for robust networks to use early stopping to
achieve the best possible robust performance.
We find that, for example, the TRADES approach relies
heavily on using the best robust performance on the test
set from an earlier checkpoint in order to achieve their top
reported result of 43.4% robust error against an `∞ PGD ad-
versary with radius 8/255 on CIFAR-10, a number which is
typically viewed as a substantial algorithmic improvement in
adversarial robustness over standard PGD-based adversarial
training. In our own reproduction of the TRADES experi-
ment, we confirm that allowing the TRADES algorithm to
train until convergence results in significant degradation of
robust performance as seen in Figure 3. Specifically, the
robust test error of the model at the checkpoint with the best
performance on the test set is 44.1% whereas the robust test
error of the model at the end of training has increased to
50.6%.4
Surprisingly, when we early stop vanilla PGD-based ad-
versarial training, selecting the model checkpoint with the
best performance on the test set, we find that PGD-based
adversarial training performs just as well as more recent al-
gorithmic approaches such as TRADES. Specifically, when
using the same architecture (a Wide ResNet with depth 28
and width factor 10) and the same 20-step PGD adversary
for evaluation used by Zhang et al. (2019c) for TRADES,
the model checkpoint with the best performance on the test
set from vanilla PGD-based adversarial training achieves
42.3% robust test error, which is actually slightly better
than the best reported result for TRADES from Zhang et al.
(2019c).5
Similarly, we find early stopping to be a factor in the robust
test performance for publicly released pre-trained ImageNet
models (Engstrom et al., 2019). Continuing to train these
models degrades the robust test performance from 62.7% to
85.5% robust test error for `∞ robustness at  = 4/255 and
63.0% to 94.8% robust test error for `2 robustness at  =
128/255. This shows that these models are also susceptible
to robust overfitting and benefit greatly from early stopping.6
The corresponding learning curves are shown in Appendix
A.3.
Validation-based early stopping Early stopping based
on the test set performance, however, leaks test set infor-
mation and goes against the traditional machine learning
paradigm. Instead, we find that it is still possible to re-
cover the best test performance achieved during training
with a true hold-out validation set. By holding out 1,000
4We used the public implementation of TRADES available
at https://github.com/yaodongyu/TRADES and sim-
ply ran it to completion using the same learning rate decay schedule
used by Madry et al. (2017).
5We found that our implementation of the PGD adversary to
be slightly more effective, increasing the robust test error of the
TRADES model and the PGD trained model to 45.0% and 43.2%
respectively.
6We use the publicly available framework from https://
github.com/madrylab/robustness and continue train-
ing checkpoints obtained from the authors using the same learning
parameters.
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Figure 4. Learning curves for a CIFAR-10 pre-activation ResNet18
model trained with a hold-out validation set of 1,000 examples.
We find that the hold-out validation set is enough to reflect the
test set performance, and stopping based on the validation set is
able to prevent overfitting and recover 46.9% robust test error,
in comparison to 46.7% achieved by the best-performing model
checkpoint.
examples from the CIFAR-10 training set for validation pur-
poses, we use validation-based early stopping to achieve
46.9% robust error on the test set without looking at the test
set, in comparison to the 46.7% robust error achieved by
the best-performing model checkpoint for a pre-activation
ResNet18. The resulting validation curve during training
closely matches the testing curve as seen in Figure 4, and
suggests that although robust overfitting degrades the ro-
bust test set performance, selecting the best checkpoint in
adversarially robust training for deep networks still does
not appear to significantly overfit to the test set (which has
been previously observed in the standard, non-robust setting
(Recht et al., 2018)).
3.3. Reconciling double descent curves
Modern generalization curves for deep learning typically
show improved test set performance for increased model
complexity beyond data point interpolation in what is known
as double descent (Belkin et al., 2019). This suggests that
overfitting by increasing model complexity using overpa-
rameterized neural networks is beneficial and improves test
set performance. However, this appears to be at odds with
the main findings of this paper; since training for longer
can also be viewed as increasing model complexity, the fact
that training for longer results in worst test set performance
seems to contradict double descent.
We find that, while increasing either training time or archi-
tecture size can be viewed as increasing model complexity,
these two approaches actually have separate effects; train-
ing for longer degrades the robust test set performance re-
gardless of architecture size, while increasing the model
architecture size still improves the robust test set perfor-
mance despite robust overfitting. This was briefly noted by
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Figure 5. Generalization curves depicting double descent for adver-
sarially robust generalization, where hypothesis class complexity is
controlled by varying the width factor for a wide residual network.
Each final model point represents the average performance over
the last 5 epochs with the corresponding width factor from training
until convergence. The best checkpoint refers to the lowest robust
test error achieved by a model checkpoint during training, and
illustrates the significant gap in performance between the best and
final models resulting from robust overfitting.
Nakkiran et al. (2019) for the `2 robust setting, and so in
this section we show that this generally holds also in the
`∞ robust setting. We explore these properties by training
multiple adversarially robust Wide ResNets (Zagoruyko &
Komodakis, 2016) with varying widths to control model
complexity. In Figure 5, we see that no matter how large
the model architecture is, robust overfitting still results in a
significant gap between the best and final robust test perfor-
mance. However, we also see that adversarially robust train-
ing still produces the double descent generalization curve,
as the robust test performance increases and then decreases
again with architecture size, suggesting that the double de-
scent and robust overfitting are separate phenomenon. Even
the lowest robust test error achieved during training contin-
ues to descend with increased model complexity, suggesting
that larger architecture sizes are still beneficial for adversar-
ially robust training despite robust overfitting. More details
and learning curves for a wide range of architecture sizes
can be found in Appendix C.
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Table 2. Robust performance of PGD-based adversarial training
with different regularization methods on CIFAR-10 using a PreAc-
tResNet18 for `∞ with radius 8/255. The “best” robust test error
is the lowest test error achieved during training whereas the final
robust test error is averaged over the last five epochs. Each of the
regularization methods listed is trained using the optimally chosen
hyperparameter. Pure early stopping is done with a validation set.
ROBUST TEST ERROR (%)
REG METHOD FINAL BEST DIFF
EARLY STOPPING W/ VAL 46.9 46.7 0.2
`1 REGULARIZATION 53.0± 0.39 48.6 4.4
`2 REGULARIZATION 55.2± 0.4 46.4 55.2
CUTOUT 48.8± 0.79 46.7 2.1
MIXUP 49.1± 1.32 46.3 2.8
SEMI-SUPERVISED 47.1± 4.32 40.2 6.9
4. Alternative methods to prevent robust
overfitting
In this section, we explore whether common methods for
combating overfitting in standard training are successful at
mitigating robust overfitting in adversarial training. We run
a series of ablation studies on CIFAR-10 using classical and
modern regularization techniques, yet ultimately find that no
technique performs as well in isolation as early stopping, as
shown in Table 2 (a more detailed table including standard
error can be found in Appendix D.2). Unless otherwise
stated, we begin each experiment with the standard setup for
`∞ PGD-based adversarial training with a 10-step adversary
with step size 2/255 using a pre-activation ResNet18 (He
et al., 2016) (details for the training procedure and the PGD
adversary can be found in Appendix D.1). All experiments
in this section were run with one GeForce RTX 2080ti unless
a Wide ResNet was trained, in which case two GPUs were
used.
4.1. Explicit regularization
A classical method for preventing overfitting is to add an
explicit regularization term to the loss, penalizing the com-
plexity of the model parameters. Specifically, the term is
typically of the form λΩ(θ), where θ contains the model
parameters, Ω(θ) is some regularization penalty, and λ is a
hyperparameter to control the regularization effect. A typi-
cal choice for Ω is `p regularization for p ∈ {1, 2}, where
`2 regularization is canonically known as weight decay and
commonly used in standard training of deep networks, and
`1 regularization is known to induce sparsity properties.
We explore the effects of using `1 and `2 regularization
when training robust networks on robust overfitting, and
sweep across a range of hyperparameter values as seen in
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Figure 6. Robust performance on the train and test set for varying
degrees of `2 regularization. `2 regularization is unable to match
the same performance of early stopping without also using early
stopping, even with an optimally chosen hyperparameter of λ =
5 · 10−3 which achieves 55.2% robust test error.
Figure 6 for `2.7 Although explicit regularization does im-
prove the performance to some degree, on its own, it is
still not as effective as early stopping, with the best explicit
regularizer achieving 55.2% robust test error with `2 regular-
ization and parameter λ = 5 · 10−2. Additionally, neither of
these regularization techniques can completely remove the
detrimental effects of robust overfitting without drastically
over-regularizing the model, which is shown and discussed
further in Appendix D.3, along with the corresponding plots
for `1 regularization.
4.2. Data augmentation for deep learning
Data augmentation has been empirically shown to reduce
overfitting in modern deep learning tasks that involve very
high-dimensional data by enhancing the quantity and diver-
sity of the training data. Such techniques range from simple
augmentations like random cropping and horizontal flipping
to more recent approaches leveraging unlabeled data for
semi-supervised learning, and some work has argued that
robust deep learning requires more data than standard deep
learning (Schmidt et al., 2018).
7Proper parameter regularization only applies the penalty to the
weights w of the affine transformations at each layer, excluding
the bias terms and batch normalization parameters.
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Figure 7. Robust performance on the train and test set with cutout
across varying patch lengths. Even with the optimal patch length
of 14, cutout does not surpass the performance of early stopping,
achieving at best 48.8% robust test error at the end of training.
Cutout and mixup Recent data augmentations tech-
niques for deep networks, such as cutout (DeVries & Taylor,
2017) and mixup (Zhang et al., 2017), are known to reduce
overfitting and improve generalization in the standard train-
ing setting. We scan a range of hyperparameters for these
approaches when applicable, and find a similar story to that
of explicit `p regularization; either the regularization effect
of cutout and mixup is too low to prevent robust overfitting,
or too high and the model is over-regularized, as seen in
Figures 7 for cutout. When trained to convergence, neither
cutout nor mixup is as effective as early stopping, achieving
at best 48.8% robust test error for cutout with a patch length
of 14 and 49.1% robust test error for mixup with α = 1.4. 8
The corresponding plots for mixup and the learning curves
for both methods are in Appendix D.4, where we see signif-
icant robust overfitting cutout but less so for mixup, which
appears to be more regularized.
Semi-supervised learning We additionally consider a
semi-supervised data augmentation technique (Carmon
et al., 2019; Zhai et al., 2019; Alayrac et al., 2019) which
uses a standard classifier to label unlabeled data for use in
robust training. Although there is a large gap between best
8We used the public implementations of cutout
and mixup available at https://github.com/
davidcpage/cifar10-fast and https://github.
com/facebookresearch/mixup-cifar10
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Figure 8. Learning curves for robust training with semi-supervised
data augmentation, where we do not see a severe case of robust
overfitting. When robust training error has converged, there is
a significant amount of variance in the robust test error, so the
average final model performance is on par with pure early stopping.
Combining early stopping with semi-supervised data augmentation
to avoid this variance is the only method we find that significantly
improves on pure early stopping, reaching 40.2% robust test error.
and final robust performance shown in Table 2, we find that
this is primarily driven by high variance in the robust test er-
ror during training rather than from robust overfitting, even
when the model has converged as seen in Figure 8. Due to
this variance, the final model’s average robust performance
of 47.1% robust test error is similar to the performance
obtained by early stopping. By combining early stopping
with semi-supervised data augmentation, this variance can
be avoided. In fact, we find that the combination of early
stopping and semi-supervised data augmentation is the only
method that results in significant improvement over early
stopping alone, resulting in 40.2% robust test error. Experi-
mental details and further discussion for this approach can
be found in Appendix E. 9
5. Conclusion
Unlike in standard training, overfitting in robust adversarial
training decays test set performance during training in a
wide variety of settings. While overfitting with larger ar-
chitecture sizes results in better test set generalization, it
does not reduce the effect of robust overfitting. Our exten-
sive suite of experiments testing the effect of implicit and
explicit regularization methods on preventing overfitting
found that most of these techniques tend to over-regularize
the model or do not prevent robust overfitting, and all of
9We used the data from https://github.com/
yaircarmon/semisup-adv containing 500K pseudo-
labeled TinyImages
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them in isolation do not improve upon early stopping.
Especially due to the prevalence of robust overfitting in ad-
versarial training, we particularly urge the community to
use validation sets when performing model selection in this
regime, and to analyze the learning curves of their mod-
els. This work exposes a key difference in generalization
properties between standard and robust training, which is
not fully explained by either classic statistics or modern
deep learning, and re-establishes the competitiveness of the
simplest adversarial training baseline.
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Figure 9. Learning curves for training an SVHN classifier which
is adversarially robust to `∞ perturbations of radius 8/255. Note
that robust overfitting occurs before the learning rate has decayed,
likely due to the lower initial learning rate.
A. Full set of results for Table 1
In this section, we extend Table 1 to additionally include
standard error and results from different adversarial training
schemes (FGSM and TRADES), as shown in Table 3. The
final error is an average over the final 5 epochs of when
the model has converged, along with the standard deviation.
The best error is the lowest test error of all model check-
points during training. For convenience we also show the
difference in the final model’s error and the best model’s
error, which indicates the amount of degradation incurred
by robust overfitting.
The remainder of this section contains the experimental de-
tails for reproducing these experiments, as well as the learn-
ing curves for each experiment as visual evidence of robust
overfitting. We default to using pre-activation ResNet18s
for our experiments, with the exception of Wide ResNets
with width factor 10 for `∞ adversaries on CIFAR-10 (for a
proper comparison to what is reported for TRADES), and
ResNet50s for ImageNet. For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100,
we train with the SGD optimizer using a batch size of 128, a
step-wise learning rate decay set initially at 0.1 and divided
by 10 at epochs 100 and 150, and weight decay 5 ·10−4. For
SVHN, we use the same parameters except with a starting
learning rate of 0.01 instead. For ImageNet, we use the same
learning configuration used to train the pretrained models
and simply run them for longer epochs and lower learn-
ing rates using the publicly released repository available at
https://github.com/madrylab/robustness.
`∞ adversary We consider the `∞ threat model with ra-
dius 8/255, with the PGD adversary taking 10 steps of
size 2/255 on all datasets except for ImageNet. For Im-
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Table 3. Performance of adversarially robust training over a variety of datasets, adversarial training algorithms, and perturbation threat
models, where the best error refers to the lowest robust test error achieved during training and the final error is an average of the robust
test error over the last 5 epochs. We observe robust overfitting to occur across all experiments.
ROBUST TEST ERROR (%) STANDARD TEST ERROR (%)
DATASET ADVERSARY NORM RADIUS FINAL BEST DIFF FINAL BEST DIFF
SVHN PGD `∞ 8/255 45.6± 0.40 39.0 6.6 10.0± 0.15 10.2 −0.2
`2 128/255 26.4± 0.27 25.2 1.2 7.0± 0.23 7.2 −0.2
CIFAR-10
PGD `∞ 8/255 51.4± 0.41 43.2 8.2 13.4± 0.19 13.9 −0.5
`2 128/255 31.1± 0.46 28.4 2.7 11.0± 0.08 11.3 −0.3
FGSM `∞ 8/255 59.8± 0.09 53.7 6.1 12.4± 0.21 13.6 −1.2
`2 128/255 31.6± 0.18 29.2 2.4 9.9± 0.16 10.5 −0.6
TRADES `∞ 8/255 50.6± 0.31 45.0 5.6 14.97± 0.24 15.9 −0.9
`2 128/255 58.2± 0.66 53.6 4.6 33.9± 0.95 15.7 18.2
CIFAR-100 PGD `∞ 8/255 78.6± 0.39 71.9 6.7 45.9± 0.23 47.3 −1.4
`2 128/255 62.5± 0.09 56.8 5.7 39.9± 0.22 37.5 2.4
IMAGENET PGD `∞ 4/255 85.5± 8.87 62.7 22.8 50.5± 14.32 37.0 13.5
`2 76/255 94.8± 1.16 63.0 31.8 63.2± 6.80 40.1 23.1
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Figure 10. Learning curves for training an SVHN classifier which
is adversarially robust to `2 perturbations of radius 128/255. Ro-
bust overfitting occurs early here as well, with robust test error
increasing after the 9th epoch.
ageNet, we fine-tune the pretrained model from https:
//github.com/madrylab/robustness (Engstrom
et al., 2019) and continue training with the exact same pa-
rameters with a learning rate of 0.001, which uses an ad-
versary with 5 steps of size 0.9/255 within a ball of radius
4/255.
`2 adversary We consider the `2 threat model with ra-
dius 128/255, with the PGD adversary taking 10 steps of
size 15/255 on all datasets except for ImageNet. For Im-
agenet, we fine-tune the pretrained model from https:
//github.com/madrylab/robustness (Engstrom
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Figure 11. Learning curves showing robust overfitting on CIFAR-
100 for the `∞ perturbation model.
et al., 2019) and continue training with the exact same pa-
rameters with a learning rate of 0.001, which uses an adver-
sary with 7 steps of size 0.5 within a ball of radius 3.
A.1. SVHN experiments
Figures 9 and 10 contain the convergence plots for the PGD-
based adversarial training experiments on SVHN for `∞ and
`2 perturbations respectively. We find that robust overfitting
occurs even earlier on this dataset, before the initial learning
rate decay, indicating that the learning rate threshold at
which robust overfitting begins to occur has already been
passed. The best checkpoint for `∞ achieves 39.0% robust
error, which is a 6.6% improvement over the 45.6% robust
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Figure 12. Learning curves showing robust overfitting on CIFAR-
100 for the `2 perturbation model.
error achieved at the end of training.
A.2. CIFAR-100 experiments
Figures 11 and 12 contain the convergence plots for the
PGD-based adversarial training experiments on CIFAR-100
for `∞ and `2 perturbations respectively. We find that ro-
bust overfitting on this dataset reflects the CIFAR-10 case,
occurring after the initial learning rate decay. Note that in
this case, both the robust test accuracy and the standard test
accuracy are degraded from robust overfitting. The best
checkpoint for `∞ achieves 71.9% robust error, which is a
6.7% improvement over the 78.6% robust error achieved at
the end of training.
A.3. ImageNet experiments
Figure 13 contains the convergence plots for our contin-
uation of PGD-based adversarial training experiments on
ImageNet for `∞ and `2 perturbations respectively. Thanks
to logs provided by the authors (Engstrom et al., 2019), we
know the pretrained `2 robust ImageNet model had already
been trained for 100 epochs at learning rate 0.1 followed by
at least 10 epochs at learning rate 0.01, and so we continue
training from there and further decay the learning rate at
the 150th epoch to 0.001. Logs could not be found for the
pretrained `∞ model, and so it is unclear how long it was
trained and under what schedule, however the pretrained
model checkpoint indicated that the model had been trained
for at least one epochs at learning rate 0.001, so we continue
training from this point on.
The `∞ pre-trained model appeared to have not yet con-
verged for the checkpointed learning rate, and so further
training without any form of learning rate decay was able
to gradually deteriorate the performance of the model. The
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Figure 13. Continuation of training released pre-trained ImageNet
models for `∞ (top) and `2 (bottom). The number of epochs
indicate the number of additional epochs the pre-trained models
were trained for.
`2 pre-trained model seemed to have already converged at
the checkpointed learning rate, and so we do not see any
significant changes in performance until after decaying the
learning rate down to 0.001.
Note that the learning curves here are smoothed by tak-
ing an average over a consecutive 10 epoch window, as
the actual curves are quite noisy in comparison to other
datasets. This noise is reflected in Table 3, where ImageNet
has the greatest variation in final error rates (both robust
and standard). Training the models further can in fact im-
prove the performance of the pretrained model slightly at
specific checkpoints (e.g. from 66.4% initial robust test
error down to 62.7% robust test error at the best checkpoint
for `∞), however eventually the ImageNet models suffer
greatly from robust overfitting, with an average increase of
22.8% robust error for the `∞ model and 31.8% robust error
for the `2 model.
A.4. CIFAR-10 experiments
For CIFAR-10, in addition to the standard PGD training
algorithm, we also consider the FGSM adversarial training
algorithm (Wong et al., 2020) and TRADES (Zhang et al.,
2019b). The convergence curves showing that robust over-
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Figure 14. Learning curves showing robust overfitting from train-
ing with an FGSM adversary on CIFAR-10 for the `∞ perturbation
model.
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Figure 15. Learning curves showing robust overfitting from train-
ing with an FGSM adversary on CIFAR-10 for the `2 perturbation
model.
fitting still occurs for these two algorithms in both the `∞
and `2 setting are shown in Figures 14 and 15 for FGSM
and Figures 16 and 17 for TRADES.
FGSM adversarial training For FGSM adversarial train-
ing, we use the random initialization described by Wong
et al. (2020). However, we find that when training until con-
vergence using the piecewise decay learning rate schedule,
the recommended step size of α = 10/255 for `∞ training
eventually results in catastrophic overfitting. We resort to
reducing the step size of the `∞ FGSM adversary to 7/255 to
avoid catastrophic overfitting, but still see robust overfitting.
We also note that Wong et al. (2020) use a cyclic learning
rate schedule to further boost the speed of convergence,
which differs from the piecewise decay schedule we discuss
in this paper. If we run FGSM adversarial training in a
more similar fashion to Wong et al. (2020) with the cyclic
learning rate and fewer epochs, we find that this can sidestep
the robust overfitting phenomenon and converge directly to
the best checkpoint at the end of training. However, this
requires a careful selection of the number of epochs: too
few epochs and the final model underperforms, whereas
too many epochs and we observe robust overfitting. In our
setting, we find that training against an FGSM adversary
for 50 epochs using a cyclic learning rate with a maximum
learning rate of 0.2 allows us to recover a final robust test
error of 53.22%, similar to the best checkpoint of FGSM
adversarial training with piecewise decay and 200 epochs
which achieved 53.7% robust test error in Table 3.
Relation of robust overfitting to catastrophic overfitting
Previous work studying the effectiveness of an FGSM adver-
sary for robust training noted that it is necessary to prevent
“catastrophic overfitting” in order for FGSM training to be
successful, which can be avoided by evaluating a PGD ad-
versary on a training minibatch (Wong et al., 2020). Here
we note that this is a distinct and separate behavior from
robust overfitting: while catastrophic overfitting is a product
of a model overfitting to a weaker adversary and can be
detected by a stronger adversary on the training set, robust
overfitting is a degradation of robust test set performance
under the same adversary used during training which can-
not be detected on the training set. Indeed, even successful
FGSM adversarial training can suffer from robust overfitting
when given enough epochs without catastrophically overfit-
ting, as shown in Figure 14, suggesting that this is related to
the generalization properties of adversarially robust training
rather than the strength of the adversary.
TRADES For TRADES we use the publicly released im-
plementation of both the defense and attack available at
https://github.com/yaodongyu/TRADES to re-
move the potential for any confounding factors resulting
from differences in implementation. We consider two pos-
sible options for learning rate schedules: the default sched-
ule used by TRADES which decays at 75 and 90 epochs
and runs for 100 epochs total (denoted TRADES learning
rate),10 and the standard learning rate schedule used by
Madry et al. (2017) for PGD adversarial training, which de-
cays at 100 epochs and 150 epochs. We additionally explore
both the pre-activation ResNet18 architecture that we use
10This is the learning rate schedule described in the paper by
Zhang et al. (2019c). Note that this differs slightly from the im-
plementation in the TRADES repository, which uses the same
schedule but only trains for 76 epochs, which is one more epoch
after decaying. In our reproduction of the TRADES experiment,
the checkpoint after the initial learning rate decay ends up with the
best test performance over all 100 epochs.
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Figure 16. Learning curves when running TRADES for robustness to `∞ perturbations of radius 8/255 on combinations of learning rates
and architectures for CIFAR10.
extensively in this paper, as well as the Wide ResNet archi-
tecture which TRADES uses. The corresponding learning
curves for each combination of learning rate and model can
be found in Figure 16 for `∞.
We note that in three of the four cases, we see a clear in-
stance of robust overfitting. Only the default learning rate
schedule used by TRADES on the smaller, pre-activation
ResNet18 model doesn’t indicate any degradation in robust
test set performance. This is likely due the shortened learn-
ing rate schedule which implicitly early stops combined
with the regularization induced by a smaller architecture
having less representational power. The results here are con-
sistent with our earlier findings on the impact of architecture
size, where the Wide ResNet architecture achieves better
performance than the ResNet18. The shortened TRADES
learning rate schedule does not show the full extent of robust
overfitting, as the models have not yet converged, whereas
the Madry learning rate does (and also achieves a slightly
better best checkpoint).
Figure 17 shows a corresponding curve for `2 robustness
using TRADES for the pre-activation ResNet18 model with
the Madry learning rate, which was the optimal combination
from `∞ training. Note that the TRADES repository does
not provide default training parameters or a PGD adversary
for `2 training on CIFAR-10 nor could we find any such
description in the corresponding paper, and so we used our
attack parameters which were successful for PGD-based
adversarial training (10 steps of size 15/255).
B. Experiments for various learning rate
schedules
In this section, we explore the effect of the learning rate
schedule with greater detail on the CIFAR10 dataset with a
pre-activation ResNet18. Our search begins with a sweep
over a range of different potential schedules which are com-
monly used in deep learning. Following this, we tune the
best learning rate schedule to investigate its effect on the
prevalence of robust overfitting.
B.1. Different types of schedules
We consider the following types of learning rates for our
setting.
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Figure 17. Learning curves when running TRADES for robustness
to `2 perturbations of radius 128/255 for CIFAR10.
1. Piecewise decay: This is a fairly common learning
rate used in deep learning, which decays the learning
rate by a constant factor at fixed epochs. We begin with
a learning rate of 0.1 and decay it by a factor of 10 at
the 100th and 150th epochs, for 200 total epochs.
2. Multiple decay: This is a more gradual version of the
piecewise decay schedule, with a piecewise constant
schedule which reduces the learning rate at a linear
rate in order to make the drop in learning rate less
drastic. Specifically, the learning rate begins at 0.1
and is reduced by 0.01 every 50 epochs over 500 total
epochs, eventually reaching a learning rate of 0.01 in
the last 50 epochs.
3. Linear decay: This schedule does a linear interpola-
tion of the drop from 0.1 to 0.01, resulting in a piece-
wise linear schedule. The learning rate is trained at 0.1
for the first 100 epochs, then linearly reduced down
to 0.01 over the next 50 epochs, and further trained at
0.01 for the last 50 epochs for a total of 200 epochs.
4. Cyclic: This schedule grows linearly from 0 to to some
maximum learning rate λ, and then is reduced linearly
back to 0 over training as proposed by Smith (2017).
We adopt the version from Wong et al. (2020) which
already computed the maximum learning rate for the
CIFAR10 setting on the same architecture which peaks
2/5 of the way through training at a learning rate of 0.2
over 200 epochs.
5. Cosine: This schedule reduces the learning rate using
the cosine function to interpolate from 0.1 to 0 over 200
epochs. This type of schedule was used by Carmon
et al. (2019) when leveraging semi-supervised data
augmentation to improve adversarial robustness.
Table 4. Tuning experiments using stochastic gradient descent to
optimize the best robust test error obtained from the piecewise
decay schedule for a pre-activation ResNet18 on CIFAR-10.
DECAY EPOCH START LR END LR BEST ROB ERR
100 0.1 0.01 46.7%
60
0.1 0.01
47.4%
70 47.3%
80 46.9%
90 47.3%
100
0.06
0.01
47.4%
0.08 46.7%
0.3 48.7%
0.5 51.0%
100 0.1
0.006 46.0%
0.008 46.1%
0.03 47.8%
0.05 49.3%
Note that the piecewise decay schedule is the primary learn-
ing rate schedule used in this paper. All of these approaches
beyond the standard piecewise decay schedule dampen the
initial drop in robust test error experienced by the piecewise
decay schedule. As a result, the best checkpoints of these
alternatives end up with worse performance than the best
checkpoint of the piecewise decay schedule, since all of the
learning rates eventually start increasing in robust test error
due to robust overfitting after the initial drop. Robust overfit-
ting appears to be ubiquitous across different schedules, as
most approaches achieve their best checkpoint well before
training has converged.
The cyclic learning rate is the exception here, which has
two phases corresponding to when the learning rate is grow-
ing and shrinking, with the best checkpoint occurring near
the end of the second phase. In both phases, the robust
performance begins to improve, but then robust overfitting
eventually occurs and keeps the model from improving any
further. We found that stretching the cyclic learning rate
over a longer number of epochs (e.g. 300) results in a simi-
lar learning curve but with worse robust test error for both
the best checkpoint and the final converged model.
B.2. Tuning the piecewise decay schedule
Since the piecewise decay schedule appeared to be the most
effective method for finding a model with the best robust
performance, we investigate whether this schedule can be
potentially tuned to improve the robust performance of the
best checkpoint even further. The discrete piecewise decay
schedule has three possible parameters: the starting learning
rate, the ending learning rate, and the epoch at which the
decay takes effect. We omit the last 50 epochs of the final
decay, since the bulk of the impact from robust overfitting
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Figure 18. Learning curves for a piecewise decay schedule with a modified starting learning rate.
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Figure 19. Learning curves for a piecewise decay schedule with a modified ending learning rate.
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Figure 20. Learning curves for a piecewise decay schedule with a modified epoch at which the decay takes effect.
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Figure 21. Standard and robust performance on the train and test set across Wide ResNets with varying width factors.
0.0
0.5
width factor 1.0 width factor 2.0 width factor 3.0 width factor 4.0
0.0
0.5
width factor 5.0 width factor 6.0 width factor 7.0 width factor 8.0
0 100 200
0.0
0.5
width factor 9.0
0 100 200
width factor 10.0
0 100 200
width factor 15.0
0 100 200
width factor 20.0
Epochs
E
rr
or
Test robust Train robust Test standard Train standard
Figure 22. Learning curves for training Wide ResNets with different width factors.
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occurs shortly after the first decay in this setting.
While tuning the starting learning rate and the decay epoch
largely results in either similar or worse performance, we
find that adjusting the learning rate used after the decay
epoch can actually slightly improve the robust performance
of the best checkpoint by 0.5%, as seen in Table 4. Note that
robust overfitting still occurs in these tuned learning rate
schedules as seen in Figures 18, 19, and 20, which show the
learning curves for each one of the models shown in Table
4.
C. Double descent: exploring architecture
sizes
For architecture size experiments, we use a Wide ResNet
architecture (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016) with depth 28
and varying widths to control the size of the network. For
each width tested, we plot the standard and robust perfor-
mance from the best checkpoint and final model in Figure
21. Learning curves for each width can be found in Figure
22. All models were trained with the same training parame-
ters described in Section 4. Mean and standard deviation of
the final model was taken over the last 5 epochs.
From both the generalization curves and the individual con-
vergence plots, we see that no matter how large the archi-
tecture is, the checkpoint which achieves the lowest robust
test error always has higher training robust error than the
final model at convergence. We also find that both the final
model at the end of convergence as well as the best check-
point found during training all benefit from the increase in
architecture size. Consequently, we find that robust overfit-
ting and double descent can occur at the same time, despite
having seemingly opposite effects on the notion of overfit-
ting.
In contrast to the standard setting, we observe that the dou-
ble descent occurs well before robust interpolation of the
training data at a width factor of 5, after which the robust
test set performance of the final model continues to improve
with even larger architecture sizes. The network with width
factor 20, the largest that we could run on our hardware,
achieves 48.8% robust test error at the end of training and
41.8% robust test error at the best checkpoint. This marks a
further improvement over the more typical choice of width
factor 10 which achieves 51.4% robust test error at the end
of training and 43.2% robust test error at the best checkpoint.
D. Preventing overfitting
D.1. Experimental setup
For the experiments in preventing overfitting, we use a PGD
adversary with random initialization and 10 steps of step
size 2/255. This is a slightly stronger adversary than con-
sidered in Madry et al. (2017) by using 3 additional steps,
and we found the attack to be more effective than the adver-
sary implemented by TRADES, achieving approximately
1% more PGD error than the TRADES adversary. However,
our goal here is to explore the prevention of robust overfit-
ting, and so it is not necessary to have strongest possible
adversarial attack, and so for our purposes this adversary is
good enough (and is known to be reasonably strong in the
`∞ setting). For training, we use the same parameters as
used for the CIFAR-10 experiments in Appendix A.4 (batch
size, learning rate, weight decay, number of epochs). We
primarily use the pre-activation ResNet18 since it is already
sufficient for exhibiting the robust overfitting behavior.
D.2. Full set of results for Table 2
In this section, we present the expanded version of Table 2
to include standard test error metrics. The final robust and
standard errors are an average of over the final 5 epochs
of training when the model has converged, from which the
standard deviation is also computed. The one exception
is validation-based early stopping, where the final error
is taken from the checkpoint chosen by the validation set,
and consequently does not have a standard deviation. The
best robust error is the lowest test robust error of all check-
points through training, and the best standard error is the
corresponding standard error which comes from this same
checkpoint. For convenience we also show the difference
in the final model’s error and the best model’s error, which
indicates the amount of degradation incurred by robust over-
fitting.
D.3. Explicit regularization
In this section, we extend the plots depicting the robust and
standard error over various regularization hyperparameters
to also show the performance on the training set. We also
show the learning curves for models trained with explicit
regularization to show the extent of robust overfitting on
various hyperparameter choices.
`1 regularization Figure 23 shows the training and testing
performance of models using various degrees of `1 regular-
ization. We performed a search over regularization parame-
ters λ = {5 · 10−6, 5 · 10−5, 5 · 10−4, 5 · 10−3}, and found
that both the final checkpoint and the best checkpoint have
an optimal regularization parameter of 5 · 10−5. Note that
we only see robust overfitting at smaller amounts of regular-
ization, since the larger amounts of regularization actually
regularize the model to the point where the performance is
being severely hurt.
Figure 24 shows the corresponding learning curves for these
four models. We see clear robust overfitting for the smaller
two options in λ, and find no overfitting but highly regu-
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Table 5. Performance of adversarially robust training over a variety of regularization techniques for PGD-based adversarial training on
CIFAR-10 for `∞ with radius 8/255.
ROBUST TEST ERROR (%) STANDARD TEST ERROR (%)
REGULARIZATION METHOD FINAL BEST DIFF FINAL BEST DIFF
EARLY STOPPING W/ VAL 46.9 46.7 0.2 18.2 18.2 0.0
`1 REGULARIZATION 53.0± 0.39 48.6 4.4 15.9± 0.13 15.4 0.5
`2 REGULARIZAITON 51.4± 0.73 46.4 8.8 15.7± 0.21 14.9 0.8
CUTOUT 48.8± 0.79 46.7 2.1 16.8± 0.21 16.4 0.4
MIXUP 49.1± 1.32 46.3 2.8 23.3± 3.04 19.0 4.3
SEMI-SUPERVISED 47.1 40.2 6.9 23.0± 3.82 17.2 5.8
larized models for the larger two options, to the extent that
there is no generalization gap and the training and testing
curves actually appear to match.
`2 regularization Figure 25 shows the training and testing
performance of models using various degrees of `2 regular-
ization. We performed a search over regularization parame-
ters λ = {5 · 10k} for k ∈ {−4,−3,−2,−1, 0} as well as
λ = 0.01. Note that 5 ·10−4 is a fairly widely used value for
weight decay in deep learning. We find that only the small-
est choices for λ result in robust overfitting (e.g. λ ≤ 0.1.
However, inspecting the corresponding learning curves in
Figure 26 reveals that the larger choices for λ have a similar
behavior to the larger forms of `1 regularization, and end
up with highly regularized models whose test performance
perfectly matches the training performance at the cost of
converging to a worse final robust test error.
D.4. Data augmentation
In this section, we present additional details for the data
augmentation approaches for preventing overfitting, namely
cutout, mixup, and semi-supervised data.
Cutout To analyze the effect of cutout on generalization,
we range the cutout hyperparameter of patch length from 2
to 20. Figure 27 shows the training and testing performance
of models using varying choices of patch lengths. Addition-
ally, for each hyperparameter choice, we plot the resulting
learning curves in Figure 28.
We find the optimal length of cutout patches to be 14, which
on it’s own is not quite as good as vanilla early stopping,
but when combined with early stopping merely matches
the performance of vanilla early stopping. In all cases, we
observe robust overfitting to steadily degrade the robust test
performance throughout training, with less of an effect as
we increase the cutout patch length.
Mixup When training using mixup, we vary the hyperpa-
rameter α from 0.2 to 2.0. The training and testing perfor-
mance of models using varying degrees of mixup can be
found in Figure 29. The resulting learning curves for each
choice of α can be found in Figure 30.
For mixup, we find an optimal parameter value of α = 1.4.
Similar to cutout, when combined with early stopping, it
can only attain similar performance to vanilla early stop-
ping, and otherwise converges to a worse model. However,
although the learning curves for mixup training are signifi-
cantly noisier than other methods, we do observe the robust
test error to steadily decrease over training, indicating that
mixup does stop robust overfitting to some degree (but does
not obtain significantly better performance).
E. Semi-supervised approaches
For semi-supervised training, we use a batch size of 128
with equal parts labeled CIFAR-10 data and pseudo-labeled
TinyImages data, as recommended by Carmon et al. (2019).
Each epoch of training is now equivalent in computation to
two epochs of standard adversarial training. Note that the
pre-activation ResNet18 is a smaller architecture than used
by Carmon et al. (2019), and so in our reproduction, the best
checkpoint which achieves 40.2% error is about 2% higher
than 38.5%, which is what Carmon et al. (2019) can achieve
with a Wide ResNet. Note that in the typical adversarially
robust setting without additional semi-supervised data, a
Wide ResNet can achieve about 3.5% lower error than a
pre-activation ResNet18.
We observe that the semi-supervised approach does not ex-
hibit severe robust overfitting, as the smoothed learning
curves tend to be somewhat relatively flat and don’t show
significant increases in robust test error. However, relative
to the base setting of using only the original dataset, the
robust test performance is extremely variable, with a range
spanning almost 10% robust error even when training error
is relatively flat and has converged. As a result, it is critical
to still use the best checkpoint even without robust overfit-
ting, in order to avoid the fluctuations in test performance
induced by the augmented training data.
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Figure 23. Standard and robust performance on the train and test set using varying degrees of `1 regularization.
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Figure 24. Learning curves for adversarial training using `1 regularization.
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Figure 25. Standard and robust performance on the train and test set using varying degrees of `2 regularization.
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Figure 26. Learning curves for adversarial training using `2 regularization.
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Figure 27. Standard and robust performance on the train and test set for varying cutout patch lengths.
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Figure 28. Learning curves for adversarial training using cutout data augmentation with different cutout patch lengths.
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Figure 29. Standard and robust performance on the train and test set for varying degrees of mixup.
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Figure 30. Learning curves for adversarial training using mixup with different choices of hyperparameter α.
